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Scotland	and	the	myth	of	the	‘Corbyn	bounce’
What	explains	the	SNP’s	performance	in	the	2017	general	election?	Although	recent	focus	has	been	on	the
‘Corbyn	factor’	theory,	Sean	Swan	writes	that	many	factors	were	at	play.	Too	much	focus	on	Corbyn	is	not	going
to	be	productive	for	the	SNP.
The	SNP,	or	at	least	sections	of	it,	have	been	dissecting	the	general	election	in	Scotland	in	order	to	see	what
went	‘wrong’	for	the	party.	In	an	article	published	on	12	June	on	Wings	Over	Scotland,	an	“SNP	activist”	stated
that	the	number	one	reason	the	party	failed	to	do	better	was	because	its	‘strategy	of	getting	pro-indy	Labour	votes
was	completely	sunk	by	the	Corbyn	bounce’.	This	view	was	also	expressed	in	an	article	in	The	National	on	9	of
June.	Several	senior	SNP	members,	echoing	the	Wings	writer,	mentioned	a	‘Corbyn	factor’	or	a	‘Corbyn	bounce’
as	a	contributing	factor	in	the	SNP’s	failure	to	do	better.
The	views	of	experienced	canvassers,	activists,	and	candidates	who	have	taken	part	in	an	election	campaign
always	provide	invaluable	insights;	however,	the	very	closeness	to	the	action	can	lead	to	a	loss	of	broader
perspective,	an	inability	to	see	the	wood	for	the	trees.	This	may	have	occurred	in	relation	to	the	‘Corbyn	bounce’.
The	first	point	that	may	have	been	lost	is	the	exceptionality	of	the	2015	general	election.	It	was	exceptional	in	the
number	of	seats	won	by	the	SNP	–	56	out	of	59	–	and	in	the	number	of	seats	lost	by	Labour	–	40	out	of	41.
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2015	was	the	product	of	the	political	mobilisation	of	defeated	indyref	Yes	supporters	behind	the	SNP.	Six	months
after	the	referendum,	SNP	membership	had	hit	the	100,000	mark,	making	the	SNP	the	third	largest	party	by
membership	in	the	UK.	Such	levels	of	enthusiasm	are	hard	to	maintain.	The	2015	general	election	represented
an	exceptional	high	point	for	the	SNP,	and	an	exceptional	low	point	for	Labour.	Some	sort	of	correction	was
inevitable.
There	was	a	‘Corbyn	bounce’	in	England:	Labour’s	share	of	the	vote	there	was	41.9%,	up	by	10.3%	on	2015,	but
there	was	no	significant	‘Corbyn	bounce’	in	Scotland.	What	happened	in	Scotland	was	that	Labour	increased	their
share	of	the	vote	by	only	2.8%	from	24.3%	in	2015	to	27.1%	in	2017.	In	absolute	numbers,	the	Labour	vote	only
increased	by	10,000.	In	terms	of	party	ranking,	Labour	actually	dropped	from	second	position	in	2015	to	third
behind	the	Tories	in	2017.	Even	a	dead	cat	will	bounce	if	you	drop	it	from	high	enough,	and	what	we	witnessed	in
the	general	election	was	a	Labour	dead	cat	bounce,	rather	than	a	‘Corbyn	bounce’.
This	lack	of	a	‘Corbyn	bounce’	in	Scotland	may	well	be	due	to	the	nature	of	Scottish	Labour,	which	remains	quite
Blairite,	but	that	is	a	different	argument.	The	extra	seats	Labour	took	in	the	recent	election	had	much	more	to	do
with	a	drop	in	the	SNP	vote	than	with	a	surge	in	the	Labour	vote	–	which	in	none	of	these	newly-won	seats
reached	the	levels	it	had	been	in	2010.
Belief	in	the	‘Corbyn	bounce’	legend	may	cause	problems	for	the	SNP	if	it	gives	rise	to	a	misconceived	and
divisive	debate	over	whether	or	not	the	party	should	move	further	to	the	left.	There	have	already	been	signs	of
this,	see	this	article	in	the	Sunday	Herald,	and	Michael	Fry’s	response	to	it	in	The	National.
Another	danger	of	an	overemphasis	on	the	‘Corbyn	bounce’	is	that	it	misses	the	point	that	while	the	SNP	lost	six
seats	to	Labour,	it	lost	twice	as	many	to	the	Tories.	One	SNP	candidate	stated	in	The	National	that	there	had
been	too	much	“centralisation”	and	that	the	campaign	had	had	a	“one-size-fits-all”	nature	which,	it	was	argued,
had	hurt	the	SNP	in	the	north	east.
‘“Scotland	is	not	one	place,”	one	candidate	said.	“Scotland	is	not	Glasgow,	nor	the	central	belt.	It’s
many	different	places,	with	many	different	demographics	and	political	realities.’
In	the	north	east	and	the	south	of	Scotland	the	SNP	lost	seats	to	the	Tories,	not	to	Labour.	An	obsession	with	the
‘Corbyn	bounce’	smacks	of	a	central	belt	obsession	(which	is	where	Labour	won	its	seats).
The	Tories	focused	their	campaign	on	stopping	Indyref2.	It	was	always	likely,	as	I	have	previously	argued,	that
‘the	centrality	of	the	independence	question	and	the	rise	of	the	SNP’	would	‘lead	to	the	‘unionist’	vote	coalescing
around	one	party	(which	would	probably	be	the	Conservatives)’.	Labour	has	revived	slightly	from	its	2015
calamity,	and	the	Lib	Dems	did	better	than	in	2015	–	but	on	a	reduced	vote.	The	Conservative	and	Unionist	Party,
on	the	other	hand,	virtually	doubled	their	share	of	the	vote	and	took	13	seats.	They	are	the	ones	likely	to	present
a	longer	term	challenge	to	the	SNP.	The	Tories		are	the	natural	home	of	the	pro-union	vote,	just	as	the	SNP	are
the	natural	home	of	the	independence	vote.	They	are	also	the	natural	home	of	the	pro-Brexit	vote.
One	potential	error	in	the	SNP’s	strategy	was	linking	independence	to	an	anti-Brexit	position.	This	was	a	rather
heroic	stance,	given	that	36%	of	SNP	voters	had	voted	Leave	in	the	Brexit	referendum.	Turnout	was	down	from
71.1%	in	2015	to	66.4%	in	2017,	and	it	may	well	have	been	pro-Leave	SNP	voters	who	stayed	at	home,	turned
off	by	the	SNP’s	pro-Remain	stance.	It	may	not	be	coincidental	that	Angus	Robertson’s	and	Alex	Salmond’s	north
east	constituencies	had	some	of	the	highest	Leave	votes	in	Scotland.	Less	emphasis	on	Brexit	might	have	saved
their	seats.
Being	pro-independence	and	being	pro-EU	are	not	interchangeable	positions.	The	SNP	could	square	this	circle
by	simply	insisting	that	questions	as	to	the	international	relations	of	a	future	independent	Scotland	are	premature
prior	to	independence.	The	Brexit	situation	could	still	be	used	to	justify	a	second	independence	referendum,	not
on	the	particular	issue	of	EU	membership,	but	on	the	way	in	which	Scotland’s	voice	was	ignored	by	the	British
government	on	such	a	fundamental	issue.
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Some	sort	of	correction	on	the	2015	results	was	inevitable.	It	was	also	likely	that	the	enthusiasm	and	membership
surge	post	the	indyref	on	which	the	2015	election	result	was	based	was	likely	to	subside.	One	senior	SNP	figure
told	The	National	that	“We	didn’t	get	our	members	out….	The	new	members	in	particular	didn’t	get	involved	and
that	hurt	us.”	Perhaps	some	new	members	failed	to	appreciate	that	politics	is	a	long	hard	slog	which	only	rarely
results	in	rapid	and	radical	change.	These	and	many	other	factors	were	at	play	in	the	general	election,	but	the
‘Corbyn	bounce’	was	more	mirage	than	reality	and	too	much	focus	on	it	is	unlikely	to	be	productive	for	the	SNP.
_____
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